88 ideas
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |