16 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
| 12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
| 17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
| 17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
| 12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
| 12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
| 12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
| 6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
| 12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |