14 ideas
| 15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
| 15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
| 15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
| 15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
| 6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
| 8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
| 8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
| 8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
| 8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
| 8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
| 8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
| 8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |