Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Aspects of the Theory of Syntax', 'Transcendence of the Ego' and 'Possible Worlds'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
7113 Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
7112 The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
7114 The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
7119 Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
7122 We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
7125 A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
7108 The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
7111 Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
22226 Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
7107 Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
7109 If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
7106 The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
7117 How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
7123 Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
22225 My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
7124 The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
7116 When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
7120 It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
7110 If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7115 Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
7121 The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
18006 Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor]