17 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |