Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Syntactic Structure', 'Senses of Essence' and 'Davidson on himself'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11178 The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
18009 Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11175 Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11176 The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
11174 A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177 Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
18007 Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]