14 ideas
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |