Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'', 'Psychology from an empirical standpoint' and 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete'

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7 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
14644 If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3364 All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
3225 Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9086 The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
9087 Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]