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All the ideas for 'Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'', 'Every Thing Must Go' and 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'

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94 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross]
Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross]
Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross]
Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross]
Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross]
A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross]
The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross]
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross]
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross]
Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross]
The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross]
The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross]
In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross]
If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]