Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'The Extended Mind'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands]
If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers]
Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]