Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logological Fragments II', 'Metaphysical Dependence' and 'The Essence of Reference'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
19588 The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis]
19598 Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
19586 Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
19587 Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
14100 Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
19597 Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
10429 It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
14096 Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14097 Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14095 Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14093 An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10434 Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14099 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
10431 Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
14098 An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]