37 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |