43 ideas
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |