Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence' and 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]