15 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |