35 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |