Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification', 'The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

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6 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19566

Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth

19568

Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

19567

The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

19570

Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox

19000

Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap]

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience

20643

Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell]