27 ideas
22271 | Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter] |
11060 | Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna] |
18909 | Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
8080 | Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
13912 | Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
8071 | Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
13819 | Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle] |
9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
11148 | Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
18896 | Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers] |
3300 | Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA] |
11149 | Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle] |
8079 | Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
14641 | A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
18911 | Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
6011 | There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara] |