42 ideas
8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
6011 | There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara] |
8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |