Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' and 'Mental Events'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]