Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What are Sets and What are they For?', 'Senses of Essence' and 'Truthmaking for Presentists'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11178 The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
14239 The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley]
14240 The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley]
14241 We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley]
14242 Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
14243 The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11175 Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11176 The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14234 If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley]
14237 We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
11174 A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
14245 Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
14246 If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
14247 Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177 Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]