13 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
9220 | Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |