86 ideas
| 24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
| 24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
| 24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| 24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| 24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
| 24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
| 24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
| 24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
| 24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
| 24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
| 24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
| 7276 | All art is quite useless [Wilde] |
| 7274 | Books are only well or badly written, not moral or immoral [Wilde] |
| 7275 | Having ethical sympathies is a bad mannerism of style in an artist [Wilde] |
| 24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
| 24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
| 24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
| 24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
| 24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
| 24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
| 24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
| 24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
| 24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
| 24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
| 24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |