58 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 16541 | All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza] |
| 22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
| 6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
| 18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
| 6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
| 16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
| 6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
| 6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
| 6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
| 6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
| 6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| 6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
| 6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
| 6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
| 6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 13073 | To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
| 6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
| 6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
| 6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
| 10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
| 6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
| 15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
| 6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
| 6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
| 6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |
| 6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |