Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Really Hard Problem', 'Value Theory' and 'On the Essence of Human Freedom'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
21833 Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
21834 Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
20956 Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
21837 Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
21830 For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
21835 We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
21831 Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
21832 Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan]