Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Really Hard Problem', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'Intending'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
21833 Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
21834 Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
21837 Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
21830 For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
21835 We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
21831 Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
21832 Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan]