Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Really Hard Problem', 'The Actual and the Virtual' and 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
21907 We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
21833 Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
21834 Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
21837 Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
21830 For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
21835 We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
21831 Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
21832 Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan]