15 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |