Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of the Soul', 'Purple Haze' and 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan]
We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan]
Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan]
We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan]