38 ideas
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |