71 ideas
23948 | Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon] |
5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
23942 | Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon] |
5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
23945 | Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon] |
13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
23957 | We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon] |
5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
23943 | Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon] |
5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
23952 | I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon] |
23954 | Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon] |
23960 | Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon] |
23961 | The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon] |
23965 | Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon] |
23959 | Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon] |
23936 | It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon] |
23963 | Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon] |
23946 | The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon] |
23940 | Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon] |
23949 | Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon] |
23956 | The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon] |
23953 | Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon] |
23964 | There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon] |
23937 | It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon] |
23947 | Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon] |
5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
23958 | The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon] |
5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
23944 | Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon] |
5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
23962 | Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon] |
23941 | 'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon] |
23955 | Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon] |
14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |
5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |