35 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |