Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Really Hard Problem', 'Against the Logicians (two books)' and 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are language [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan]