17 ideas
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
| 13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
| 3214 | The models we use in reasoning may be more like perceptions than like language [Johnson-Laird] |
| 15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
| 8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
| 13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
| 12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |