140 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |