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All the ideas for 'Db (lexicon)', 'Logic in Mathematics' and 'Sameness and Substance Renewed'

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136 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
11300 Agathon: good [PG]
11301 Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
11302 Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
11303 Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
11304 Aletheia: truth [PG]
11305 Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
11306 Ananke: necessity [PG]
11307 Antikeimenon: object [PG]
11375 Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
11308 Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
11376 Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
11309 Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
11310 Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
11311 Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
11312 Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
11313 Chronismos: separation [PG]
11314 Diairesis: division [PG]
11315 Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
11316 Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
11317 Diaphora: difference [PG]
11318 Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
11319 Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
11320 Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
11321 Eidos: form, idea [PG]
11322 Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
11323 Empeiron: experience [PG]
11324 Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
11325 Enkrateia: control [PG]
11326 Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
11327 Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
11328 Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
11329 Epithumia: appetite [PG]
11330 Ergon: function [PG]
11331 Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
11332 Eros: love [PG]
11333 Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
11334 Genos: type, genus [PG]
11335 Hexis: state, habit [PG]
11336 Horismos: definition [PG]
11337 Hule: matter [PG]
11338 Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
11339 Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
11340 Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
11341 Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
11342 Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
11343 Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
11344 Meson: the mean [PG]
11345 Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
11377 Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
11346 Morphe: form [PG]
11347 Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
11348 Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
11349 Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
11350 Orexis: desire [PG]
11351 Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
11352 Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
11353 Phantasia: imagination [PG]
11354 Philia: friendship [PG]
11355 Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
11356 Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
11357 Physis: nature [PG]
11358 Praxis: action, activity [PG]
11359 Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
11360 Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
11361 Sophia: wisdom [PG]
11362 Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
11363 Stoicheia: elements [PG]
11364 Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
11365 Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
11366 Telos: purpose, end [PG]
11367 Theoria: contemplation [PG]
11368 Theos: god [PG]
11369 Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
11370 Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
11371 To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
11372 To ti estin: essence [PG]
11373 Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11832 We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
16877 A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
11219 Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
16878 We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
16867 Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
16863 Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege]
16862 The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
16865 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11863 (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
16866 Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege]
16868 The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege]
16871 A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege]
16870 Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
16869 To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
16864 If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14746 What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11900 We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
11870 Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11866 The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
11896 A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
15835 Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
11841 The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
10679 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
14364 A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11851 Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
11865 The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14744 Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9388 Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
14749 Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
11844 If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11861 We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11871 Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
11879 Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
11835 The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
11876 It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
11858 The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
11831 The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
11839 Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
11845 Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
11869 Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11850 Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11848 Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16876 We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
16875 We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
11859 The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
16879 A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
16873 Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
16872 A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
16874 The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
11860 Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]