127 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| 18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
| 18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
| 18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
| 18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
| 18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
| 18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
| 18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
| 18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
| 18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
| 18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
| 18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
| 18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
| 18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
| 18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
| 18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
| 18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
| 18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
| 18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
| 18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
| 18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
| 18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
| 18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
| 18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
| 18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
| 18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
| 18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
| 18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
| 18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
| 18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
| 18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
| 18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
| 18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
| 18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
| 18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
| 18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
| 18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
| 18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
| 18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
| 18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
| 18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
| 18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
| 18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
| 18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
| 21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |