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All the ideas for 'Db (lexicon)', 'Sententia on 'De Caelo'' and 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'

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110 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
Aletheia: truth [PG]
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
Ananke: necessity [PG]
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
Chronismos: separation [PG]
Diairesis: division [PG]
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
Diaphora: difference [PG]
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
Empeiron: experience [PG]
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
Enkrateia: control [PG]
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
Ergon: function [PG]
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
Eros: love [PG]
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
Genos: type, genus [PG]
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
Horismos: definition [PG]
Hule: matter [PG]
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
Meson: the mean [PG]
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
Morphe: form [PG]
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
Orexis: desire [PG]
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
Philia: friendship [PG]
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
Physis: nature [PG]
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
Theos: god [PG]
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
To ti estin: essence [PG]
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]