69 ideas
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
6012 | We must choose in which of the virtues we wish to excel [Panaetius] |
6013 | Panaetius said we should live according to our natural starting-points [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
6014 | Panaetius identified courage with great-mindedness, preferring civic courage to military [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |
5888 | Souls are born, since they are sensitive and inherited, so they must perish [Panaetius, by Cicero] |