Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explanation in Mathematics', 'Dthat' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]