35 ideas
13166 | Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu] |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |