Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction'' and 'Universals and Particulars'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
10571 Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
1502 Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10565 There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10564 We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10569 If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10570 Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
10573 Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
10575 Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
10574 Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
10560 Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
10568 Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
449 Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
448 No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
447 Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
445 The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
1503 There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21820 Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
452 All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563 A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1504 Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
444 The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
450 Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
451 Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
1506 Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3058 Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10561 Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
10562 We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
10567 We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
555 People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
226 The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
5081 There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
1509 The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
20900 Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
1505 Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
453 Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
1792 He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
5115 It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
13217 The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
22918 What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1794 He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
1791 He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]