Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth', 'Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason' and 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


49 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]