Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)', 'Absolute Necessities' and 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic'

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19 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]