Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)', 'The Case for Contextualism' and 'Anti-essentialism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13412 Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
13413 We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
13411 If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
13415 An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19514 Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
19515 We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
19510 In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
19516 Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19511 If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]