11 ideas
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
13412 | Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf] |
13413 | We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf] |
13411 | If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf] |
13415 | An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |