Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyticity Reconsidered', 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction' and 'Theological and other works'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]