22 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |