26 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
20482 | Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne] |
20480 | There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne] |
20481 | Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne] |
20479 | People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne] |