Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyticity Reconsidered', 'Philosophia Epicurea' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 5: Abstraction'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
23651 Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
23650 Only individuals exist [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
23649 No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
16640 Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11874 Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
23652 We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
23648 First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]